Sandbox
One of the fundamental questions of a philosophical analysis of nonsense is that of its ontological status: is the attribution of nonsense a purely subjective one, such as “Delicious!” or “Impressive!”, or does it have an objective content?
In other words, is nonsense just a matter of opinion?
Harry Frankfurt has worked out the epistemic-ontological conditions of nonsense: Whether an utterance is stupid does not depend on whether it is true or false, and not on whether the speaker has stammered or polished it, but on the triangular relationship between it, the speaker and the world. If the speaker intends to speak truthfully about the world, then he is not talking nonsense in the technical sense. Not even if his statement is not the wisest. But if he speaks with a different intention and neglects the truthfulness of his statements, then he is talking nonsense.
Bullshitters, as Frankfurt understands them, present themselves as purveyors of the truth, although that is precisely not their intention. Instead, by their very nature, they are fakers and imposters who use their speech to manipulate the opinions and attitudes of those to whom they are speaking.
Most people rely on their nose – i.e. their pre-theoretical intuition – to detect bullshit, just as they do with physical excrement. But this can be deceptive and, in the worst case, can produce bullshit itself.
According to Frankfurt, bullshit is an even greater threat to our civilization than lying. “It’s important for us to respect the truth,” he says. “The liar does not undermine our respect for the truth, but our knowledge of it. This is bad, but it distinguishes him from the bullshitter, who undermines our respect for the truth.” In this way, the bullshitter disregards the value of truth even more deeply than the liar.